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RETHINKING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: ARE 
THERE LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL 
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE? 
MODERATOR: DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
PARTICIPANTS: ANITA HALVORSSEN, J. KEVIN HEALY, WILLIAM PIZER, 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
RYAN CANTRELL 
For those of you who do not know me, my name is Ryan Cantrell. I am 
the Editor-in-Chief of the Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, and, together with the Whitney R. Harris Institute (Harris 
Institute), Global Studies Law Review put together this panel discussion on 
the Kyoto Protocol. I realize there are probably various levels of 
knowledge about the Kyoto Protocol here, but it is basically the 
international treaty designed to govern climate change and global 
warming. So, today we assembled this panel of experts from a variety of 
different fields to discuss the Kyoto Protocol, global warming, and climate 
change. I am now going to turn it over to Professor John Owen Haley, the 
director of the Harris Institute and a professor of International Law here at 
the Washington University School of Law. Professor Haley is going to 
introduce our panelists today. 
PROFESSOR HALEY 
Thank you, Ryan. It is a real pleasure for me to introduce the speakers 
and say a few words of welcome. This is a program that I have long 
wanted to happen. When I first became director, we had a debate on the 
International Criminal Court that I thought was one of the best programs 
that the Institute had sponsored. We have wanted, for some time, to 
duplicate that with a discussion on the Kyoto Protocol, and problems and 
legal solutions to global warming. So this discussion today culminates an 
effort that I was particularly interested in seeing happen for a long time. 
But, secondly, I also particularly appreciated that this program was put 
together by the editors of the Global Studies Law Review. It is, I think, 
very important for the health of the institution, and particularly the health 
of the Harris Institute, for the institute itself to work very closely with 
student organizations to let the students take the initiative and come to us 
to try to facilitate the realization of those ideas that they have begun to 
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formulate. And of this program—I should tell you from the outset, I and 
those of us in the Institute staff, have had very little to do with putting it 
together. This was the responsibility of the editors of the Global Studies 
Law Review and you can judge for yourself how successful they have 
been.  
Our participants today include Professor Douglas Williams. Professor 
Williams is a full-time professor of environmental and international 
environmental law at St. Louis University School of Law. We welcome 
him back. He has taught and worked with us here at Washington 
University on a number of occasions. He is a former rock musician, 
carpenter, and a graduate of Duke Law School. Professor Williams clerked 
for the Honorable Douglas H. Ginsberg on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. He became an associate at 
Covington and Burling, LLP, in Washington D.C. in 1988, a time when 
the federal government began asserting claims for damages to natural 
resources. He was among the first attorneys to develop an expertise in this 
area, and has written extensively about the relationship between state and 
federal regulators and voluntary versus regulatory approaches to 
environmental protection. 
Joining Professor Williams today will be Dr. Anita Halvorssen. Dr. 
Halvorssen is the director of Global Legal Solutions, an international think 
tank and consulting firm. She teaches international law in the political 
science department at the University of Colorado, and is also an adjunct 
professor at the University of Denver College of Law, where she teaches 
Sustainable Development and Trade. Dr. Halvorssen was formerly a senior 
executive officer at the Royal Ministry of Environment in Norway and has 
worked with the law firm of Home Roberts & Owen in Denver, Colorado. 
She has also taught European Union Law and International Environmental 
Law at the School of Law at the University of Colorado, and was a fellow 
at the Natural Resources Law Center. Dr. Halvorssen is the author of a 
number of works, including Equality Among Unequals in International 
and Environmental Law: Differential Treatment for Developing Countries. 
She has also written several articles on climate change, particularly the 
noncompliance mechanism and the clean development mechanism.  
Joining her will be Mr. J. Kevin Healy. Mr. Healy is a partner at Bryan 
Cave’s New York office, specializing in Environmental Law. He has 
practiced environmental law and land use law for more than thirty years. 
He represents parties in regulatory and permitting matters under the Clean 
Air Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the New York State 
Environmental Quality Review Act. He served on Governor George 
Pataki’s Climate Change Task Force and chaired the Emissions Trading 
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subcommittee of that group. He also co-chairs the Global Climate Change 
subcommittee of the Environmental Law section of the New York State 
Bar Association. He has lectured and written extensively on the subject of 
climate change for the last several years. 
Dr. William Pizer has been a fellow at the Resources for the Future 
since August 1992. He has worked part-time as a senior economist at the 
National Commission on Energy Policy. From 2001–2002, he served as a 
senior economist at the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, where 
he worked on environmental issues including global climate change. He 
was a visiting scholar at the Stanford University Center for Environmental 
Science and Policy from 2000–2001, and taught at Johns Hopkins 
University from 1997–1999. Dr. Pizer has contributed to several books 
and published numerous journal articles and reports on climate change.  
Our final participant is Mr. Jacob Werksman. Mr. Werksman is the 
senior advisor to the Global Inclusion Program at the Rockefeller 
Foundation where he funds work on intellectual property rights and trade 
policy. Prior to joining the Rockefeller Foundation, he served as an 
Environmental Governor Advisor to the United Nations Development 
Program. Most of his work on climate change was carried out from 1990–
2000 at the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development. There, he and his colleagues provided legal advice and 
assistance to the Alliance for Small Island States during the negotiations 
for the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and its Kyoto Protocol. Dr. Werksman teaches international environmental 
trade and investment law at New York University School of Law. I would 
like for you to join me in welcoming all of our participants to Washington 
University and this program. Thank you very much.  
I will now turn it over to Professor Williams. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Thank you, Professor Haley. To start things off, one of my colleagues, 
Professor Halvorssen, has a set of slides that introduces us to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
This presentation is just to give you a background so you can get an 
idea of what climate change is all about—for those of you who have not 
followed these issues very closely. This slide is from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and it talks about climate change and how it 
works. It is called the greenhouse effect. There are already natural 
variations as far as climate goes, which is why it is warm enough to live 
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on planet Earth, but climate change is a phenomenon where human 
activities have been compounding this greenhouse effect. And it has made 
it a lot stronger. It is going a lot faster. So the Scripps Institute came out 
with a report in February 2005 saying that there was very compelling 
evidence that human activities are responsible for global warming, despite 
the Bush Administration’s explanation of natural climatic fluctuations. 
The Scripps Institute used oceans rather than the atmosphere for their 
evidence. The likely impacts you have probably heard of are more 
frequent severe storms, droughts, and ice cap and glacier melts. There was 
a report in the fall that the Artic ice would be gone in the summer sixty 
years from now, so 2065. It is already being reduced 8% per year, so two 
times the size of Texas has been depleted in the last few years. And what 
you have to keep in mind is that you cannot pinpoint one particular event. 
You cannot say Katrina is a direct effect of climate change, but we know 
that this is the way it is going, that those more severe storms will come 
and droughts and so forth.  
Responding to climate change, the international community adopted 
the U.N. Framework Commission on Climate Change (Framework 
Convention), which came into force in 1992. The object of the Framework 
Convention is to achieve stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) to prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.1  
Three principles that are outlined in this Framework Convention are 
sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and common, but 
differentiated responsibilities. Sustainable development is development 
where you take into account the generation we have now fulfilling their 
needs without compromising the needs of future generations. The 
precautionary measures oblige states to take action even, if there is 
uncertainty on the science, if irreversible damage can be the outcome. And 
common, but differential responsibilities, stipulated in article 3(1) of the 
Framework Convention are really important. Historically, China had very 
few cars or manufacturing industries to speak of that would be generating 
carbon dioxide, so you cannot blame them for our present predicament. 
Now China is catching up, and it will surpass the industrialized countries 
in their emissions of carbon dioxide in the near future. 
Next, we will talk about what commitments are in the Framework 
Convention. There are no binding commitments, as such, as far as cutting 
 
 
 1. Anthropogenic interference is an interference caused by human activities. An example of a 
GHG is CO2 (carbon dioxide), which is produced when humans use the fossil fuels. 
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down on the greenhouse gases. However, all parties are supposed to create 
national inventories specifying what their emissions are. The Framework 
Convention stipulates that the industrialized countries are to take the lead 
in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. This is spelled out in article 
4(2) of the Framework Convention, and you have to combine article 4(2), 
paragraphs (a) and (b) to get the whole picture. This results in an “aim” to 
return greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2002, which amounts to 
a non-binding commitment. 
The Framework Convention does have reporting requirements that are 
considered binding, with different time tables for different types of 
countries: Annex 1 parties being the industrialized ones and the non-
Annex 1 parties being developing countries. These are considered binding 
commitments. 
Then you have the financial mechanism, article 21, for technology 
transfer and financial assistance. Article 21 established the global 
environment facility (GEF) as the institution that would manage the 
financial mechanism. So that is where all the money would go, and from 
there, it would go to the developing countries needing help. Article 4(3) of 
the Framework Convention stipulates that the Annex I countries, the rich, 
developed countries, not including the economies in transition, are to 
provide new and additional financial resources enabling developing 
countries to fulfill their commitments under the Framework Convention.  
Then we have the institutions set up by the Framework Convention. 
These include the Conference of the Parties (COP), the secretariat, the 
subsidiary bodies, one for implementation and one for scientific and 
technological advice.  
Article 4(2)(d) of the Framework Convention specifies that the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) was to review the adequacy during its 
first session, and that was a COP-1, in 1995. They adopted the Berlin 
Mandate, which stated that more action needed to be taken to address 
climate change, strengthening the commitments of the parties, and the 
developed states, or Annex I states, were to “take the lead.” That resulted 
in the Kyoto Protocol. That is the focus of today’s panel, but you always 
have to go back to the Framework Convention, because it is a convention 
that works with the Protocol, so a lot of the things apply from the 
Framework Convention.  
The Kyoto Protocol has 156 parties.2 They include the Annex I parties 
(developed countries) and the non-Annex I parties (developing countries). 
 
 
 2. The Kyoto Protocol has 170 parties as of February 14, 2007. See Secretariat of the 
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The Protocol was adopted in 1997 at COP-3, and former President Clinton 
signed it in 1998. The Bush administration, however, withdrew its 
signature in 2001.  
The core commitment of article 3 is to reduce overall greenhouse 
emissions by 5% below the 1990 level in the first commitment period. We 
are talking about the five-year period spanning 2008–2012. These 
emissions are carbon dioxide, methane, and so forth, listed in Annex A of 
the Kyoto Protocol. How much each individual Annex I party is required 
to reduce their emissions by is stipulated in Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol. In the Kyoto Protocol the parties are also required to review the 
Protocol according to article 9. Article 10 of the Protocol reaffirms the 
Framework Convention’s commitments to producing the national 
inventories, and article 11 reiterates the commitments of financial 
assistance for developing counties. The Framework Convention and Kyoto 
Protocol really work in tandem. 
Several entities are created under the Framework convention and are 
referenced in the Protocol. The Conference of Parties (COP), the supreme 
body of the Convention, has been meeting every year since the treaty 
entered into force. Once the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in spring of 
2005, the COP, serving as a meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP/MOP), could finally meet for the first time, which they will do in a 
week’s time in Montreal. The Secretariat and the two the subsidiary bodies 
I just talked about in the context of the Framework Convention also 
perform functions under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Now, the big innovation introduced with the Kyoto Protocol, and what 
the United States had been pressuring for, was to have flexible market-
based mechanisms. There are three of them: the Joint Implementation 
stipulated in article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development 
mechanism in article 12 of the Protocol, and Emissions trading in article 
17. Article 18 talks about the noncompliance mechanism, which is also an 
innovation because it is not only facilitative, as which is available in 
several other international treaties, but it also has an enforcement 
procedure. The Marrakech Accords, which operationalized the Kyoto 
Protocol, came up with a lot of the rules on how these mechanisms would 
work in 2001.  
Article 25 has the entry-into-force requirements. It is a two-tiered 
process. First, you had to have fifty-five states, incorporating parties 
 
 
Framework Convention, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/ 
application/pdf/kp_rat_131206.pdf. 
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included in Annex I (industrialized countries), ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
That was the easy part. They reached that threshold very quickly, but then 
it had to be 55% of the greenhouse gas emissions of the Annex I parties, 
and that could only be reached by having Russia join. On February 16, 
2005, thanks to Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, these 
requirements were fulfilled, and the Protocol finally entered into force. 
This was a deal cut with the EU. In return for its ratification, the EU would 
help Russia obtain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
This is what they are hoping for since the United States did not ratify and 
instead withdrew from the Protocol.  
I have a slide on emissions trading, which is a market-based 
mechanism where you cap the amount of GHG emissions you can emit, 
and then you can trade the surplus if you manage to further cut down your 
emissions. The emissions trading mechanism takes place only between 
Annex I parties (developed countries). It is similar to the sulfur trading 
that has been going on in the United States for several years. The 
commitments under Annex B of the Protocol stipulate the emission 
reductions targets the states have to reach by the end of the first 
commitment period. In a manner of speaking, it is as if the states are 
allowed to sell the space in which they can emit GHGs. When you can cut 
down more than what your commitments require, then you can sell that 
space to another state. The other state can then apply the credits toward its 
commitments.  
This is allowed, of course, if you look at the globe as one because, 
obviously, all of these gases do not look at where the borderlines of any 
country or nation are. The cuts can be made irrespective of where the 
gases are created. It still makes it cheaper if you have done everything you 
can domestically. Then you can trade with other states to get credits or 
allowances to apply to your commitments. You can also sell the credits 
when you do not require them for compliance because you have already 
reached the targets. There are, however, many drawbacks.  
The Kyoto Protocol system also talks about “hot air.” All the former 
Soviet republics had very “dirty,” highly polluting industries, but a lot of 
them just closed down after the Soviet Union fell apart. They are getting 
new industries with environmentally “clean” technologies. This easily 
reduced their amount of emissions, so they have a surplus of space in 
which to emit GHGs. They can sell this “hot air” to other states. So you 
say, “Well wait a minute, where is the benefit to the whole system?” But 
despite this argument, trading “hot air” is a way of starting up the system. 
You can argue about it, but it is still a possibility. It makes for more 
incentives. Annex I parties are required to hold a minimum level of 
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credits, so they cannot sell off all of it, otherwise they will not have any 
space to emit GHGs, since they will produce more GHGs as they develop. 
Furthermore, emissions trading shall be supplemental to the domestic 
actions. So you have to do something domestically in addition to using 
emissions trading.  
Now, for emissions trading to work, there have to be strict rules on 
how it is going to be done because, otherwise, you can have fraudulent 
transactions, and the system will lose credibility. You have to enforce caps 
to make this system work. When there are scarcer credits they become 
more valuable and there is more incentive to control the emissions, 
because you want to cut down your emissions so you can sell them and 
you can make more money. In January 2005, Europe had already started 
their Emissions Trading Scheme. At that point, it was nine dollars per ton 
of carbon, that is, the price of the allowance to emit one metric ton of 
carbon dioxide. Joint implementation, the second flexible mechanism, 
entails that you can have projects arranged between industrialized 
countries cutting down on emissions. For example, the U.K. can set up a 
project in Romania or Poland, and then get credit towards its own 
emission reduction goals in the U.K. Mostly these projects take place in 
economies in transition, such as the Czech Republic. There is also a 
supervisory committee established to monitor the mechanism which is 
stipulated under article 6 of the Protocol.  
The third flexible mechanism, the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), is something totally different. We are still talking about projects, 
but we are not talking about projects between industrialized states. We are 
talking projects between industrialized states (Annex I parties) and 
developing countries (non-Annex I parties). This is the only flexible 
mechanism where developing countries can participate in mitigating the 
effects of climate change. They cannot trade emissions like the 
industrialized states can, but they can have projects in their countries 
carried out by Annex I parties. These projects then give credits toward the 
Annex I countries’ emission reduction commitments. These projects are 
meant to promote sustainable development in developing countries. They 
also represent another way of bringing money and technology to 
developing countries.  
Private entities are also involved in this system, which is, as mentioned, 
a market-based mechanism. It has an “additionality” requirement, which 
means that whatever your project might be in the developing country, it 
has to result in additional emissions reductions than would have occurred 
if the project had not taken place. If the developing country were going to 
build a coal fired power plant, and you, as an Annex I country, brought in 
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technology for a gas fired power plant, then additional GHGs would be 
removed, qualifying the Annex I state to get credits that it can use toward 
its Annex B commitments. CDMs projects also have to be in addition to 
domestic efforts to cut down GHG emissions in the industrialized states. 
CDMs projects got underway in the year 2000. Two percent of the 
proceeds from CDMs go towards helping developing countries most 
vulnerable to climate change to meet their adaptation costs. 
This is complicated material, but if you go on the internet, there is the 
web site for the Secretariat of the Framework Convention, which has a 
wealth of information on these issues. Thank you very much. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Thank you, Professor Halvorssen. What I would like to do now is to 
begin a discussion on a number of topics. Probably the most prominent 
issue here with the Kyoto Protocol has to do with the United States’ 
decision not to ratify this protocol to the climate treaty. And there are, of 
course, large concerns about what that non-involvement might mean. To 
get things started, I would first like to ask the panelists about the prospects 
of the United States actually getting re-involved in the international 
process. And I can start with you, Professor Halvorssen. What do you 
think about the prospects of the United States coming back to the table? If 
not now, perhaps during a second commitment period after 2012? 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
I would hope so. It is looking pretty unlikely right now, but this 
administration might not be there in another three years and a new 
administration might have a different outlook. The other part is, I think, 
awareness-building is happening to a larger extent in the United States 
now than in the past. Of course, if you are not a scientist, it is difficult to 
know what is what, but it is clear there is a consensus on the science that 
this is a problem, it has to be dealt with, and it is human activity that is 
creating this problem. So where does this take us?  
The media does not portray it as a consensus. What the media does say 
is, “Well we have to take both sides of the story and give them equal 
time.” But that is not correct. So there is a problem there, but I think more 
and more people are coming around because the effects are already 
happening in the Artic, which have had an impact on the Inuits’ lives. It is 
clear that the glaciers are melting, and if you have been to the Glacier 
National Park, it is not the same as it used to be. There are real changes 
out there. I think there is a chance that the United States will come back to 
the table, because public opinion is going to change, and the businesses 
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are going to get involved. Because they want to make money, businesses 
in the United States can say, “Well, we could be the ones to do emissions 
trading who make a quick trade and make a profit and that sounds like 
something along the lines of the stock market,” which is true enough. But 
you also have oil companies. The European oil companies have a different 
outlook than the American oil companies, which is strange. British 
Petroleum (BP), for instance, is involved in emissions reduction programs, 
and they are saying climate change is a problem that needs to be 
addressed. They are improving energy efficiency, whereas Exxon Mobil is 
not interested. They are still wondering about the science. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Mr. Healy, I wonder if you might address this too, because there has 
been a ground swell of activity domestically coming from the states, from 
religious leaders, and a variety of sources. What do you make of all this 
and where is it taking us? 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
Well, I think the first thing to mention is that the Bush administration 
has decided not to get into the Kyoto Protocol regime primarily because of 
its concerns with respect to the economic consequences of imposing 
mandatory controls on CO2 emissions in this country. And I believe that 
bad news has been rolling in as a result of research that has been done by 
the United States and other countries. The United States is one of the 
leaders in research in this area, and the research is confirming that the 
models that were originally predicting climate change are turning out to be 
substantially correct. The symptoms of climate change are beginning to 
show, as just mentioned. So the bad news is rolling in, and the result of 
that is that pressures are building from all different directions for 
mandatory controls in this country.  
Clearly, the environmental groups are at war with the Bush 
administration. Robert Kennedy, Jr. has written that President Bush is the 
worst environmental president ever. Those are harsh words, but that is 
what he—representing a major environmental group—is saying. So it is no 
surprise that the environmental groups are frustrated and pushing for some 
meaningful action on climate change. But, because of the really 
catastrophic consequences being predicted and the fact that symptoms are 
beginning to present themselves, pressure is coming from other directions 
as well. For example, the religious groups, the Catholic Conference of 
Bishops, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Council of 
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Churches, have all gotten together and called for mandatory controls on 
the emission of greenhouse gases. 
Politically, the pressures are building, even within the Republican 
Party. Senator McCain is pushing very hard for mandatory controls in this 
country, because he does not believe that voluntary controls and voluntary 
initiatives are working. He believes that mandatory controls are the only 
way to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Senate, in June 
of 2005, passed a resolution that said, first of all, that it looks like 
greenhouse gases are causing or are at least partially to blame for causing 
the change in the climate that we have been experiencing, and said that 
mandatory controls are going to be required. The Senate passed that 
resolution just this year.  
As we mentioned a few minutes ago, many states are pushing very hard 
for action on climate change by the federal government. Twelve states 
have sued the federal government to have CO2 recognized as an air 
pollutant under the Clean Air Act. In this lawsuit, the states contend that 
the EPA has an obligation to regulate carbon emissions from motor 
vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. That lawsuit thus far has 
not been successful, but the fact that it has been initiated by twelve states 
is a really amazing thing. There have been many other legal initiatives and 
litigations commenced to get something done at the federal level to 
address climate change. But there is pressure—political pressure and legal 
pressure—being brought to bear on this issue as well.  
Internationally, the United States is being styled as an outcast with 
respect to climate change. Our close ally, the U.K., is pushing very hard 
for us to get into the mandatory controls game. Prince Charles has recently 
referred to climate change as “terrifying.” The English are very committed 
to addressing the issue, and they are trying to get us committed as well.  
And as mentioned a second ago, even corporations are starting to push. 
BP is one, and Duke Energy another. The CEO of Duke Energy is 
beginning to make comments seeking mandatory federal greenhouse gas 
controls. Cynergy, General Electric, and several other major corporations 
are doing the same, and I think that the primary reason for that is the fact 
that there is an atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion that has 
developed around this issue, and business does not like uncertainty. They 
need to plan, and they need a road map to plan by.  
All these things are coming together to make me believe that 
mandatory controls are inevitable in this country, whether sooner or later. 
The only questions are (1) how we are going to do it, and (2) when we are 
going to do it. And, if there are going to be mandatory controls in this 
country, then it is clear to me that it would make sense to coordinate it 
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with an international regime in one way or another. Whether that is going 
to be the Kyoto Protocol as we know it or not, we will have to see, but I 
think that there will be some serious discussion about this in Congress, and 
there is going to be some progress along those lines in the very near future. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
What about the shape of any domestic policy? Mr. Werksman, maybe 
you can help here. Talk about how the United States was instrumental in 
fashioning what we now know as the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the 
flexible mechanisms. Does that suggest that anything we are going to do 
domestically will take the form of a cap and trade program, similar to the 
sulfur dioxide program in the Clean Air Act?  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Well, I think it is an important point to keep in mind that, even with the 
growing acceptance that climate change is a problem and this country has 
an obligation to do something about it, there is a gap between that and 
actually joining the second commitment period and signing some aspect of 
the Kyoto Protocol. In saying that, I think it is important that we 
acknowledge that when you are dealing with an international legal 
regime—an international treaty—there is no law without consent, and 
there is no consent without consensus about the approach amongst all the 
countries that are going to be involved.  
We had that consent. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol text was adopted 
with all those elements that were outlined on the power point projector and 
the United States was absolutely instrumental in that design. The vice 
president of the United States at that point, Al Gore, who some of you may 
remember and who has written on this topic and feels very personally 
committed to it, turned up in Kyoto and signed the United States up to a 
seven percent reduction from its 1990 levels of greenhouse gases. One of 
the reasons that the United States felt so comfortable in signing up to it 
was because it was so instrumental in the design. Essentially, the major 
inspirations for design of the Kyoto Protocol were the Montreal Protocol, 
which has successfully been cutting down the production of ozone 
depleting substances and has made great progress in patching the hole in 
the ozone layer over the poles, and secondly, the U.S.’s design of its own 
domestic emissions regime, the Clean Air Act, and its efforts towards a 
cap and trade program, with a most efficient way of setting legally binding 
caps on emissions of sulfur dioxide and then allowing companies within 
the United States’ jurisdiction to seek the cheapest way of reducing those 
gases by setting up a market in tradable emissions permits. So the United 
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States was very much on board at that stage for a whole variety of reasons 
that we might get into later. It certainly signaled, at that stage, that 
international law, by adopting what we had learned from solving other 
global environmental problems and the best practice of what we were 
doing domestically, could actually offer a kind of global solution.  
If the United States is going to be reengaged, it may be in the sort of 
bottom-up way that people are beginning to discuss now. As pressure 
builds for us to do something, we will begin at the local level—at the state 
level—to put in place local cap and trade mechanisms. If that gets 
federalized, again, there will be pressure to seek out the cheapest 
opportunities for emissions reduction, which will not be in this country but 
will be in other countries, like developing countries, where the energy 
production is much less efficient than it is in this country. That may then 
reengage the international community to figure out, if we are individually 
designing cap and trade programs within each jurisdiction, how to then 
begin to join them together again in some sort of internationally linked 
process. It will be, I think, through a gradual consensus building from the 
bottom up that will then drive us towards an international treaty, unlike the 
original design of the Kyoto Protocol, which was very much, I think, a 
top-down approach where we had these great ideas from past experience 
about solving a much more tractable problem: the ozone problem. And, 
when we tried to apply it to the ultimate challenge of regulating every 
aspect of human activity that emits greenhouse gases, which is just about 
everything that we do that takes energy, the ambition did not quite match 
the tools and political will that was necessary to actually get everyone 
signed up at that moment in time. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Is there any indication now that a cap and trade program might actually 
work? I know the EU’s program is starting up. Is it going to work? I 
wonder, Mr. Pizer, if you can talk a little bit about what would really make 
for an effective emissions trading program and whether there is any real 
possibility of it happening?  
WILLIAM PIZER 
I think the question of whether or not a cap and trade works depends on 
how you look at it. The EU emissions trading program is working in the 
sense that, right now, there is an incentive in Europe to reduce CO2 
emissions in the power sector and four other sectors that are involved in 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), and that price 
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right now is actually not the nine dollars mentioned earlier. It is up, I 
think, around twenty dollars. It peaked earlier in the year at around thirty.  
The thing to think about with carbon dioxide that I want to emphasize 
here is that, unlike SO2 and the acid rain program, or ozone depleting 
substances that were regulated under the Montreal Protocol, for CO2—
which is the principal greenhouse gas caused by burning fossil fuels—
there are no ways to reduce emissions once you burn the fossil fuel. So the 
only things we are talking about doing when we are talking about reducing 
CO2 emissions is either switching among fossil fuels, burning less coal and 
more gas, or simply using less of them overall. There are some 
technologies down the road that might capture and sequester the emitted 
CO2, but those are particularly expensive. 
This brings me to the point I wanted to make to answer your question. 
A cap and trade system by itself, which is something that puts a price on 
carbon dioxide emissions and creates an incentive for people like you and 
everybody else to go out and reduce their emissions, is likely only to be 
part of the solution. That is because climate change and solving its 
problems are fundamentally about developing new technologies. Unlike 
the acid rain program and the Montreal Protocol that were about trying to 
get people to adopt existing technologies to solve a problem, this is really 
about getting people to do things and invent new technologies. If we think 
about that, the kinds of incentives that you would create by just using 
caps—which is the Kyoto Protocol approach, and the approach in the EU-
ETS, and the acid rain program—is going to be really tough.  
I recently saw an estimate that in order to encourage the private sector 
to capture and sequester carbon—the way we keep using fossil fuel 
without emitting CO2—would require an incentive on the order of thirty 
dollars per ton of CO2. If we were going to try to put that sort of a price on 
emissions in the United States, it would create a $200 billion dollar market 
for CO2. Now, if you think about it for a second, $200 billion is about the 
amount of the revenue of the electric generating sector as a whole. It is 
about ten times the size of the revenue in the coal sector. So we would be 
talking about an incredibly invasive program in terms of changing the 
prices of energy products in the United States. So I think what is much 
more likely is a cap system, like we have in the Kyoto Protocol or the EU-
ETS, coupled with technology programs, and perhaps coupled in a way 
whereby the cap and trade program is actually financing the technology 
programs. And I think it is through that sort of a program, the marrying of 
an incentive on reducing emissions and some other incentives to adopt 
new technologies, that we are eventually going to be able to make 
headway. Once the United States begins to adopt that sort of a program—
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and I agree with the previous speakers who said that is likely to happen at 
some point—I think we can then return to the international stage and begin 
to think about the kind of international treaty that would embrace that sort 
of action. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
What about time lines here? If we are talking about technological fixes, 
we have to have a fairly long lead time. Does that suggest, perhaps, that 
the kinds of targets that are specified in the Kyoto Protocol are unrealistic? 
I have heard reports from Europe that suggest that the European 
community is really not on track in terms of reducing its emissions. How 
do we get from here to there? Is Kyoto fundamentally flawed in the sense 
that it sets these targets with a fairly short lead? Would anyone like to 
comment? 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
I was recently on the website of the Secretariat of the Framework 
Convention, and noticed that they have just come out with a report called 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, and they talked about the EU reducing 
their GHGs by 6%, which is achievable, and they are on that target. Of 
course, that is due, in no small measure, to the industries from former 
Eastern European states that can now easily replace their existing 
technology with cleaner technology, thus reducing their emissions. As a 
result, they have a lot of “hot air” that they can trade. So, it is not looking 
so bad, but going ahead is another issue because it is easy to take simple 
measures—using existing cleaner technology and energy efficiency. But 
then you have all the headaches of figuring out the next step. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
I was just going to add that one of the things that they are facing in 
Europe is that there were a number of things that happened since 1990 
which made their compliance with their target a little bit easier. One thing 
was East Germany reunified with West Germany and got the benefit from 
the reduced emissions after 1990 in Eastern Germany. There was also a 
switch to natural gas in England that reduced their emissions when they 
stopped using as much coal.  
But, if you look at the trends in all these countries, emissions are 
actually going up. They are below their targets, but they are rising in some 
sense. So I think they are still going to be confronting problems, as you 
noted, moving forward. 
p333 Kyoto Protocol book pages.doc 4/25/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:333 
 
 
 
 
If I could make just one quick point, what people do not realize is that 
the U.S. target in the Kyoto Protocol was actually much harder to achieve 
than most other countries’ targets and that is driven in large part by the 
fact that the United States, unlike most countries, has been experiencing a 
lot of population growth. And population growth drives emissions growth. 
So while a lot of countries were looking at being a few percentage 
points—maybe five or ten percentage points—above what their target was, 
the United States was looking at being about thirty percent above its 
target. The only other country that really had that sort of a problem was 
Canada, which has similar population growth. So for the United States, 
that was a really tough goal. For countries without population growth, it 
was a little bit more reasonable. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
You are talking about domestic efforts? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Domestic, yes. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
That is the whole point with the flexible mechanisms. They can 
facilitate trade with other states, right? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Right. If you could trade and get all the hot air out of Russia and 
Eastern Europe that was forecast to be there, potentially that would have 
solved a lot of the problems. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
And the projects under the clean development mechanism carried out 
in developing countries could bring a lot of credits to the Annex I parties 
(industrialized countries) to use toward their emission reduction 
commitments. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Which is stuck right now. The clean development mechanism is not 
working. I mean, if they are not approving projects at a rate they will 
actually— 
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ANITA HALVORSSEN 
They have approved thirty-five projects and they have got 400 projects 
coming down the pipeline. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Yeah, but the rate at which they are approving them, I think somebody 
could—  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
But it is still worth the effort. I have not heard that it has gotten stuck. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
I think the problem is that there is a bottleneck. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Maybe that is a better way of expressing it. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
My understanding is that there are going to be somewhere around 100 
coal-fired power plants coming online in the United States over the next 
couple of decades, or at least they are in the pipeline, and hundreds, 
literally hundreds, in China. The question is about the technological fix 
and the pace at which progress can be made. The Department of Energy, 
as I understand it, is putting a great deal of time and effort into 
development of technologies for stripping out CO2 from emission streams 
from power plants and somehow using pipelines to convey that CO2 for 
geological sequestration. And I guess the question I have for you is 
whether that is a workable way to make progress in the short term or 
medium term?  
WILLIAM PIZER 
I think your lead into that question answers it. The way I always looked 
at it is that we have got to figure out a way that we can continue to use 
coal and solve the problem of climate change. If not for ourselves, for 
China. Unless we want the rest of the world to be using nuclear power, 
there really are not a lot of other viable sources of electricity that are not 
fossil-related. That said, it is a tough problem. 
I have started by saying that the estimated costs right now for capture 
and sequestration is about thirty dollars per ton of CO2. There are lots of 
unanswered questions in that number, however, especially about how well 
the CO2 will actually stay in the ground once you inject it. I was recently 
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talking to someone (since we are at a law school I guess it is relevant) 
about the liability issues. Once you inject it into the ground, who is 
actually liable if it leaks? So trying to deal with all these physical as well 
as regulatory issues I think it is going to be one of the real problems. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
What if you look at alternative energy? You focus and put in a ton of 
resources and a ton of scientists and you make that the first priority. 
Would that make a difference on the economics because they say the 
alternatives are too expensive, it is not worth it, and we cannot go that 
way? We’ve got to carry on with what we have. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Well, I think, you are talking about renewable energy. I think there are 
some very promising renewable energy sources. Wind is clearly 
competitive with conventional power right now. So that is a huge success. 
But there is a question about how much wind power, as well as renewed 
environmental objections to wind power, that may create some limits for 
that. Solar has been something that people have always been very excited 
about. The Japanese have been pouring money into solar for the past 
twenty years, and now it is at about twenty cents a kilowatt hour, which 
makes it useful for certain applications, but does not bring it nearly into 
competition with coal, which is like three cents a kilowatt hour. So if you 
are talking about creating a technology that developing countries would 
want to embrace, or that we would be able to embrace in a large sense, I 
am not sure. There are also bio-fuels that might be interesting alternatives, 
but I have not seen as much work on that. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
But when you mentioned Japan pouring research into it and money into 
it, has the United States done that for any of the alternative energy forms? 
Pouring it in? Has that ever happened? I got the impression that the 
renewable energy research was getting its budgets cut.  
WILLIAM PIZER 
I have not—one could look at the Department of Energy (DOE) 
budgets. I do not know off the top of my head.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
I think Jacob wanted to jump in here. 
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JACOB WERKSMAN 
Well maybe not with the answer to that question, but I think that the 
general issues that we are looking at are what kind of changes in behavior 
are we trying to achieve. And I think there were two visions that we 
looked toward in creating the Kyoto Protocol. One was a change of 
behavior in terms of simply being less profligate in our use of energy. Is 
there a way in which you could create international law that would make 
people more conscious, countries more conscious, and economies more 
conscious about the amount of energy that they are producing? The other 
vision was the drive towards new kinds of technologies. You know, are we 
focused more on trying to find the technological fix that essentially allows 
us to do whatever it is that we want to continue to do in terms of energy 
use and not suffer the consequences, the climate change consequences? 
Some of the visions that are emerging for sort of a post-Kyoto world or a 
Kyoto-plus, or a second version of Kyoto, I think are focused much more 
on the technology side of things than on the legally binding sort of hair-
shirt of everyone agreeing to cut back on their emissions. One of the ways 
in which you can sort of predict where the world might be going is by 
looking at the European experience. They are the ones that are under the 
Kyoto Protocol. They are the ones that, at least now, are holding firm and 
steady, and they think this is a regime they are going to continue to 
support and participate in. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
If I may interject here, how firm do you think they are? Isn’t Tony 
Blair sending sort of mixed signals these days, talking about the next 
commitment period being something that is shaped radically different than 
the Kyoto Protocols? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
He certainly is. And if you want to see the mediating force between 
what the United States wants and what the Europeans might aspire to, 
usually you look to the U.K. and what they are doing. On the positive side, 
the U.K. had the leadership on the G8 this year. And they had a big 
summit in Glen Eagles, Scotland, and Blair identified two main priorities 
in his platform. One was Africa and the other was climate change. So the 
U.K. continues to say that this is a critically important global issue for 
them, but then [Blair] has gone on to ask, “Where does the solution to 
climate change lie?”  
He recently wrote an editorial in The Observer, a left-of-center 
newspaper in the U.K., in which he sent some mixed signals. He clearly 
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came out that he thought that the next phase has to involve legally-binding 
commitments. This is still the forefront, but the shape of those 
commitments, and what we are going to form the consensus around in 
order for the consent which is essential for commitments to actually take 
shape, was much more technologically cooperation-oriented than caps-
oriented. All of the language was about cooperating on developing new 
technologies, and then sharing them—to your point about the importance 
of China reforming as well as the United States reforming its energy use—
and sharing them in those countries whose energy use is beginning to 
grow.  
Now I do not know what that looks like in terms of the commitment. Is 
the commitment to pour in more money? Is it sort of an obligation that 
each country will put a certain percentage of their annual budgets into 
renewable energies or alternative approaches? Is it an obligation to provide 
additional funding, to developing systems, in countries like China or India, 
to uptake that new technology? It is not at all clear. But if that is the logic 
of where he is going, it is definitely a very different shape of international 
treaty than what we saw in the Kyoto Protocol. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Let us talk for a minute about the issue of the cost of hitting our targets. 
And that was one of the United States’ principal objections, or at least an 
objection articulated by President Bush. The other one was the lack of 
commitments on the part of some fairly large emitters of greenhouse gases 
and the fastest growing nations in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, 
particularly India and China. These countries have come up a couple of 
times. And can we bring these people to the point where they are willing 
to accept a binding commitment? Are the developed countries in a position 
where, perhaps, they can begin to think about developing low emissions 
projects or other technology transfers instead of sitting on the sidelines and 
hoping for clean development mechanisms? Can we expect them to come 
to the table with something to offer?  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
As I mentioned earlier, differential treatment for developing countries 
comes into play when you look at the issue historically. Who has been 
emitting most of the GHGs in the process of industrialization up until 
recently? There has been a paradigm shift in international environmental 
law. Developing countries are not industrialized, so why should they be 
punished while they are trying to develop and get their economies going, 
trying to catch up with the industrialized nations? Why should they be 
p333 Kyoto Protocol book pages.doc 4/25/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] RETHINKING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 353 
 
 
 
 
punished for something they did not do? It is an equity issue. And then 
with the Kyoto Protocol, the whole system, from the adoption of the 
Framework Convention to the entry into force of Kyoto, is very specific. 
The idea was for the industrialized countries to take the lead in taking on 
binding commitments. So with the United States emitting one quarter of 
all greenhouse gases on earth having pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol, 
then what is the motivation or the feeling of obligation by developing 
countries that were waiting for the industrialized countries to take the lead 
to reduce their GHG emissions? So I think I can see their point. Why 
should we do anything if the United States has pulled out? But if you look 
at China, they are moving right along on technologies. They have even 
planned to use hydrogen buses for the Olympics in 2008. So they are 
really trying to push their own system. They are getting a lot of advice 
from industrialized countries. They are a little ahead on this, and their own 
people, their own scientists, are getting on with it. They are seeing the 
effects. They are part of the Kyoto Protocol, but they do not have 
commitments because that was the deal under the Kyoto Protocol: 
industrialized countries were to take the first steps. So you say, “Well, that 
was fine for the first commitment period, but they should get reduction 
commitments for the next commitment period because when Kyoto was 
set up, they were not as big emitters as they are now, soon surpassing 
everybody else on greenhouse gas emissions.” 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Certainly, if our objective is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
such a way as to mitigate the potential ill effects of climate change, we 
have to bring those countries in at some point. There certainly is the 
argument from equity, but there is also just the practical argument that 
without these countries’ participation and meaningful commitments, at 
least to slow the rate of growth, what the rest of the world is doing may be 
inconsequential. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
You are exactly right. And I am less optimistic, even if the United 
States were in some sort of a global capping program, that we would be 
able to convince developing countries to join. My experience talking to 
people, or talking to people who talked to people in these countries, is that 
their priority is development. Their priority is industrialization. Their 
priority is making sure their people can eat, be sheltered, heated, and 
warmed, and transported. Those things all require energy. If your cheapest 
source of energy is coal, and the alternative is importing some sort of fuel, 
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you are really going to turn to your coal first. And that is why, when I 
think about the technology solutions, or I think about the picture of a 
solution in the future, it is some sort of agreement where we are sharing 
technologies with them, which we have developed, that are not too much 
more expensive than what they would otherwise use. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Can we picture a time when, instead of making the mistakes we have 
made to get here, production of power and energy will be possible in a 
more sustainable and clean way? Mr. Healy? 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
If you think of the numbers, it really is astounding. My understanding 
is that in China, there is one car for every couple of hundred people. In the 
United States it is one car for every 0.77 people.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
I guess it is a bit sanctimonious for the United States to stand by, and 
say, “Well, we want you guys to get involved, but—” 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
That is one take on it. The other take on it is that the ratio will shift as 
the economy of China builds and gets more robust. It will shift, and when 
you think of it, the solution will not be that you cannot have a car. The 
solution is going to have to be some sort of technological solution.  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
And the Kyoto Protocol is set up to do that also. In other words, the 
richer industrial countries, Annex II parties, under the Framework 
Convention, are supposed to contribute the funding so that these 
technology transfer programs can move ahead. And they have set up 
special funds for the least developed countries to help them with 
technology assistance. And the clean development mechanism will move 
projects to those countries too, thereby also introducing new technologies. 
So I think there is progress. There is no doubt about it.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
You mentioned that the MOP is having its first meeting in Montreal 
literally as we speak, or in the next week or so. What is on the agenda 
there? I know one of the items to be discussed is what happens after the 
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first commitment period? Any ideas? Anybody have any insights on what 
the discussion is likely to look like? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
My impression is that it is going to be largely a procedural meeting and 
that there is not going to be any negotiations of great substance there. But 
my guess is there will also be a lot of positioning, especially given what 
has been in the press from Blair, and from Bush, and from all that has been 
happening with the developing countries. There will be a lot of signaling 
of where people want to go next.  
The Secretariat has indicated that they do not expect any formal 
submissions, from parties to the negotiations, for the second commitment 
period until the beginning of next year. That is when they would expect 
them to come in. So I think that maybe there will be a lot of posturing, and 
probably a lot of support from the Europeans about the continuing 
maintenance of the regime. There is importance in there still being a forum 
in which there is negotiation of rules and common policies on climate 
change even before a lot of negotiation of substance. It is the first meeting 
of the Kyoto Protocol parties. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
I picked up on the Secretariat’s web cast. They are also talking about 
how technology really is part of the problem, as in cars making the 
pollution. But then technology is being used to come up with the solution. 
So they are also scheduled to discuss the capture and sequestration 
possibility of CO2.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
I wanted to come back to this issue of where is the hope that we are 
going to get developing countries, especially the larger developing 
countries, on board? And I think that one of the many things that is 
changed since 1990 when those rules were set, when we set up the 
dynamic of the Kyoto Protocol based on the North taking the lead and the 
South following us as we lead, is obviously all the economic and political 
developments that have taken place. What has also become true is that 
they have become more like us in all the good ways and all the bad ways. 
So when we look for hope, for what would move them to take steps, it 
will be very similar to what is going to move us to take steps. It is going to 
be continuing local air pollution from the burning of coal; cities choking 
slowly on the emissions from power plants and also cars. It is going to be 
a growing awareness of the high costs of certain fossil fuels, and the 
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pressure, as the cost of using petroleum and natural gas rises, to look for 
alternatives. It is really going to be those factors that will begin to drive 
the political will from the grassroots to begin to look for alternatives; to 
begin to figure out what it is in their national immediate interests; to begin 
to look for alternatives and solutions. It is the same dynamic that is 
happening here. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
There has been one development that was touted a bit recently. Is it the 
United States’ intention to participate in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate? Notably, India and China are somewhat 
involved in the process. Does anybody know very much about what is 
going on here? There have been some suggestions that these sorts of 
regional agreements are putting the whole climate issue on a different 
track which might undermine the Kyoto Protocol. Anybody? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
My impression is that since 2000, when the Bush administration came 
in, and even before that, the United States has always been pursuing these 
sorts of bilateral or mini-lateral exercises. And I think that, until there is 
real money so the people in these countries actually see some tangible 
benefits, I am personally a little skeptical. I think it is kind of the 
repackaging of existing commitments, but I am not knowledgeable about 
it. That is just speculation. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
The only thing I can say about it is when the announcement was made, 
it was made clear that it was intended to be supplemental to Kyoto. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
It is interesting to speculate why. The press releases that came out of 
the State Department and Australia all made the point that this was not an 
attempt to undermine Kyoto and it would operate in parallel with Kyoto. 
And to speculate whether that was the United States taking into account 
the sensitivities of the Europeans because it did not want to be seen as 
undermining the regime that Europe has continued to support, or it was the 
developing countries trying to make the point that this space that we have 
reserved for us under Kyoto, which says no new commitments for us for 
the time being, is not to be undermined by these agreements; that they do 
not want to see our beginning of a partnership with the United States and 
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Australia over greenhouse gas emissions as suggesting that we are ready to 
undertake any kind of commitments yet. 
[The Asia-Pacific Partnership] has a lot of parallels with what Blair has 
been saying in terms of the focus on technology, and the need to engage 
not just the existing parties to the Protocol and not just those that have 
commitments, but also the United States, Russia, China, and India. All of 
that language is very similar to what the Blair administration has been 
saying recently. The only main difference is that Blair used the term 
“legally binding commitments,” whatever shape they may be, and the 
State Department certainly did not include those in the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Just to add on to that, there is the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change that came out with a report. It is an international group that 
addresses some of these very same issues that is looking at doing parallel 
tracks where it might not be Kyoto 2, but it would be something 
connecting it with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. That 
just came out last week.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Let us talk a little bit more about this equity issue. Professor 
Halvorssen, I know this has been a topic of concern for you. Tell us about 
how the Clean Development mechanism might be an avenue for equitable 
arrangements, and whether there are any serious problems? 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
There are. The whole bureaucracy, and how it is supposed to function, 
is a problem right now. Like you said, there is a bottleneck. That is one of 
the issues they are going to talk about at this meeting a week from now in 
Montreal, the first meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  
On the equity side, I would say the clean development mechanism will 
help and will bring some technology to developing countries. For instance, 
if France is interested in getting credits towards its commitments, it can 
utilize the clean development mechanism and set up a cleaner burning 
power plant in China, thus bringing that technology to China. It is a win-
win situation, which will help in bringing technology to these countries.  
But if you look at the history, you mentioned the Montreal Protocol 
was the model for the Framework Convention. In the Montreal Protocol, 
we were looking at the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. The 
Protocol demonstrated that in order to get China and India on board, they 
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had to set up a fund to help replace the ozone-depleting technology. 
Because it could not use the CFC, the manufacturers came up with a 
substitute. The whole thing was that you could move this into developing 
countries by paying for it. And they had a particular fund, the Multilateral 
Fund to use, which still works, and the approach has proven successful. So 
one could think of a similar fund, maybe specific to China and India which 
are the big emitters that really need help, get them on board somehow, and 
they might have more incentives. This is not going to happen very easily, 
but if they became Annex I parties, they could participate in emissions 
trading also, if they needed another incentive. But to do this, they would 
have to come on board as an Annex I party—as part of the industrialized 
group. And some are already saying, “Well, wait a minute. China, with its 
rapid growth, should already be an industrialized country in that sense.” It 
is all relative. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
I am just going to make the observation—one thing that is problematic 
about the Clean Development mechanism, for those of you that do not eat 
and sleep it, is that it is fundamentally based on the idea that you want to 
make sure that every ton of credit you are getting is actually a ton being 
reduced somewhere in the world. This is where the bottleneck has arisen. 
They want to make sure that for each of these projects, whatever the 
credits are, these are real gold plated credits.  
The other approach to this is to really think about something like the 
Clean Development mechanism as a vehicle to channel funds to 
developing countries for things we want to see developing countries do. 
The fact that people in this trading program are getting credits for it, that is 
just kind of the gravy to get the funds to go to the developing countries.  
You can imagine a system where you are standardizing the credits—the 
different activities receive in a much more easily measurable way, which 
would solve a lot of the bottleneck problems. It would, on the flip side, 
erase this idea that all the extra tons getting reduced in the industrialized 
countries are being exactly offset by reductions in developing countries. 
But maybe that is not so important. You are going to have your price 
incentive in the industrialized country. You’re going to create this flow of 
funds for desirable projects in developing countries, and that may free up 
some of the bottlenecks that we have been talking about.  
As I understand it, this is the kind of approach that the northeastern 
states have taken. They are setting up a small regional trading program in 
the United States, or they are trying to, for their offset programs. They are 
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standardizing the offset crediting mechanism so that it does not get hung 
up on project-by-project accounting.  
The one thing I would just throw a word of caution about is the idea of 
funding the transition through a government-to-government transfer. I am 
not sure how the funding mechanism works in the Montreal Protocol, but 
my guess is that it is so much larger for climate change that it may be hard 
to use the Protocol. The Montreal Protocol’s mechanisms may be a good 
model for what the Kyoto Protocol ought to look like.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Well, we already have a financial mechanism similar to the Montreal 
Protocol for Climate Change and that is the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), which essentially funds through grants rather than by awarding 
emissions credits. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
I was thinking more specifically, similar to the Multilateral Fund. The 
Fund seemed to be a whole machine on how to get this technology to 
developing countries. There seem to be several avenues to use to get the 
technology out to the developing countries, including grants from the 
GEF. The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol is very specific: 
funds are used specifically to replace ozone depleting technology. If that 
can be arranged with GEF, that would be useful. Then there would be 
more streamlining, and it may be more effective.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
For those of you that are interested in this aspect of international 
environmental issues—the funding aspect of it—the GEF is going through 
some really interesting transitions lately in response to what the United 
States is insisting on in all aspects of this development assistance: for 
every grant that [the U.S.] gives to a particular country, it wants to ensure 
that that country has a governance structure in place to use those funds 
effectively. If you have been following the Millennia Challenge Accounts, 
which are something that USAID has been setting up to provide funds to 
developing countries, those developing countries, before they are eligible, 
really have to show that they have good governance in place—not a lot of 
corruption. That the actual ministries that are going to carry out that 
project are operating efficiently.  
[The U.S.] has been able now to introduce that into the GEF as well. 
The tradeoff for doing that—the way which they got the developing 
countries to accept these new governance criteria for projects on climate 
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change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, and international waters—was to 
give these developing countries greater control over how the funding was 
spent, in exchange for which they agreed that these new governance 
criteria would be applied. In the past the GEF has relied, as did the 
Montreal Protocol, on international agencies to pick the best technologies 
and the best techniques. The World Bank, United Nations Environment 
Program, and United Nations Industrial Development Organization would 
design the programs and then the countries would basically have to accept 
the money with the project attached to it, and implement it.  
Now [the developing countries receiving assistance] are going to be 
given a freer reign. They are the ones who are going to nominate the 
projects and as long as they meet the governance criteria, they get the 
money. So it is actually moved a bit in the opposite direction from the 
Montreal Protocol. It is less technology-specific. It gives the country more 
flexibility in terms of how they spend the money. Through that process, 
international law or international institutions have less control over those 
same priorities. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
I assume there is some accountability as to the kind of projects, and 
that they are actually using the money and not just handing it over to 
somebody to pocket in their Geneva account? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
If they have good governance, then they feel satisfied that the country 
is in a position to spend the money wisely. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
It seems from the talk I have heard that the clean development 
mechanism looks to be a win-win sort of arrangement. But it has been 
controversial. Why is it not universally viewed as a win-win kind of 
arrangement? I have heard charges of eco-imperialism being leveled in 
association with this mechanism. What are the developing countries afraid 
of with this kind of deal?  
WILLIAM PIZER 
I am not sure. I know one complaint I heard a while ago was that the 
industrialized countries would come in and do all these projects, come in 
and do all these cheap emission reductions, and then leave the developing 
country with a future prospect of not being able to do anything if it were 
based on some sort of commitment. I have never really bought into that 
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argument. I am not sure. Maybe some other people have heard some 
other— 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
That is the “low-hanging fruit” argument, that the Clean Development 
mechanism will basically provide cheap offsets for industrialized countries 
in the first phase of its operation, and then in the second commitment 
period, if India or China signs up and commits itself to capping its 
greenhouse gases, it will already have sold off essentially all of the easy 
emissions reductions, the “big bang for the buck” projects, maybe the 
forestry projects that are relatively low cost. That is one of the charges that 
was of concern. Of course, that assumes a lot in order to come true.  
In the area of land-use and land-use change projects, you are essentially 
saying that the way in which the Clean Development mechanism works is 
that the European Union, or the U.K., or me or one of my companies, 
invests in a forestry project, for example, in Costa Rica, right? And if I 
demonstrate year-to-year that the trees are growing more rapidly than they 
would have done—that additional trees have been planted for each ton of 
carbon that is fixed by those trees—the U.K. or my company gets to emit 
more greenhouse gases. That is the kind of deal, right? In order for that to 
work from an environmental point of view, however, those trees are going 
to have to be in place for quite some time, right? We are talking about 
emissions actually released by a U.K. company. They are emitting that 
CO2. So those trees have to be there, at least theoretically, indefinitely. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Presumably locking the host state into a pattern of land use, which 
ultimately may not work. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Right. It commits them to change their behavior. They have to lock in 
that land-use while the U.K. can continue to emit. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Is there any convergence between the Clean Development mechanism, 
which I understand can be the result of privately funded projects, and the 
efforts of some multi-national corporations to push us toward the Kyoto 
sort of solution? Has there been some support among multi-nationals for 
moving the United States toward participation in Kyoto? Mr. Healy? 
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J. KEVIN HEALY 
The multi-national companies are really caught between two worlds. 
To the extent that they have facilities in the United States and facilities in 
Kyoto countries, they are faced with two different sets of considerations in 
running their businesses. Because of the limitations that have been 
imposed on the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Marrakech Accords, those companies cannot use reductions in the United 
States to achieve their targets in the Kyoto countries. So they are betwixt 
and between, and what they would like is to have some rationalization of 
the situation where they could run their businesses on a more integrated 
fashion. So that is the problem. Some facilities are subject to the Kyoto 
requirements, some are not. Those that are not could achieve reductions 
and trade them with facilities subject to Kyoto, and those reductions could 
be used towards the commitments. But as of today, they cannot be traded 
under the Marrakech Accords. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Let me push this a little bit. I am puzzled that multi-nationals and some 
other economic enterprises are interested in getting the United States 
involved and perhaps pushing for some kind of emissions-trading regime. 
It reminds me a bit about the old saw that they have to have a good 
economic reason for doing this and part of it might be this problem they 
are facing, as you suggested. But is it perhaps that we might be 
experiencing the same kind of bloated estimates of costs that we 
experienced for the SO2 program, which in its initial sort of stages was 
projected to just cost too much. And it has turned out to be a bargain. Do 
multi-nationals know something that the rest of us do not know? Perhaps 
about how compliance might be achieved? I know you can not answer 
these questions. But do they feel like they can profit from an emissions 
trading regime? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
I wanted to go over the last question a little bit, and then I will move on 
to the first one. I think that the hiccup in that argument—and I have heard 
it made a lot—is that it assumes that the compliance obligations of the 
company, which in theory gets credits for the United States and then uses 
them to comply in Europe, in the United States are sufficiently weak that it 
can actually generate credits. If you can imagine the United States going 
into a Kyoto obligation situation and ramping down 30% on emissions in 
the United States which is what would have been required before trading. 
All the models—well actually—I think most of the models probably 
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would have had the United States still selling, but you can imagine a 
situation where that same company is actually creating credits and has to 
comply in the United States. So I think it really depends on what sort of 
regime they are envisioning taking place in the United States.  
One of the arguments, which I think is very strong for why U.S. 
companies have been eager to see the United States engage, has been that 
when the United States was engaged in the Kyoto Protocol, as you pointed 
out, it was really the voice for a lot of the impressive flexibility 
mechanisms that were put into the Protocol. Typically, it was arguing 
against other people who wanted to restrict them in different ways. So 
there is generally a lot of concern that, when the United States left the 
Protocol, it was going to leave a lot of important decisions to people who 
were not as well equipped to answer them. The reality is that the rest of 
the world caught up to speed pretty quickly and has actually done a decent 
job of figuring out how to do these things.  
The other argument that I have heard, which makes a little bit more 
sense to me—and again I am just wearing my little “funky economist” hat, 
which is fairly small—is that the United States, if facing the prospect of a 
lot of different state-level regulations companies, would rather have a 
federal policy. And that is a little more sensible. But then, again, it goes to 
what the federal policy looks like. If the federal policy is much more 
aggressive, then they are obviously not going to like that. But I think there 
is some desire for simplicity. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
The issue is that, in the absence of some central organizing force like 
the federal government, there is a hodgepodge of regulation that is starting 
to develop. You have got Kyoto applicable to the U.S. businesses with 
facilities in the countries that have ratified the treaty. You have the 
northeastern and mid-Atlantic states developing their own cap and trade 
programs for certain power plants, at least in the first instance. You have 
got certain states, like Massachusetts and New Hampshire, capping carbon 
emissions from power plants. You have mandatory reporting in New 
Jersey. You have California imposing CO2 emissions controls on motor 
vehicles with New York piggybacking off of that. You have got more than 
thirty, maybe more than forty states developing climate change action 
plans. On top of that, you have the conference of mayors who came out 
saying that their membership is going to achieve the targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol. So nature abhors a vacuum.  
All these entities are moving in to do something about a problem they 
view as requiring immediate action, and companies are faced with the 
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prospect of different requirements being imposed by different 
jurisdictions.  
I have been practicing environmental law for more than thirty years, 
and I have seen this kind of situation before, for example, in connection 
with the transportation of hazardous materials. In the ’70s and ’80s, there 
was a great deal of concern over trucks carrying hazardous materials, and 
so several localities and states began to regulate that activity. A patchwork 
quilt of regulations began to develop, and concerned industry leaders went 
to Congress and said, “We have got to rationalize this. We have to put 
together a federal program that will preempt localities from imposing 
regulations and allow them to engage in only certain types of regulatory 
activities.” That was, in fact, what was put into place.  
Other examples are the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. The 
Clean Air Act is really an ingenious partnership between the federal 
government and the states, under which national air quality standards are 
set and the states go about the business of achieving those standards. The 
states put together their own “implementation plans.” However, they have 
to be approved by the EPA, and they are all required to achieve those 
federal standards. The point is that, throughout the history of 
environmental regulation in this country, when there was a problem, the 
localities and the states got together and found their own way to try to 
address the problem, and at some point it got cacophonous, and the Feds 
stepped in. And now, the companies that are seeking federal involvement, 
having that history in mind, would like to somehow get some coordination 
going. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
I definitely agree with that coherence point—that companies want 
coherence across jurisdictions. Whether they think that Kyoto is going to 
be the right mechanism to bring the pressure on the federal government to 
create that coherence is still an open question. You often also hear about a 
similar point. People say, “Well, companies also want predictability.” 
There is a lot of talk about regulating greenhouse gases, and that creates 
risk within the system. They really want to be able to predict their costs in 
the future, so they want predictability.  
I think that is right, but I think they would prefer to settle for 
predictability of no Kyoto rather than predictability of Kyoto. That is 
better for them, presumably, in the long-term. The only thing, when you 
are dealing with multi-nationals, that might make things a bit 
unpredictable is if Europe really begins to cut down on its greenhouse gas 
emissions, then it begins to put their companies at a competitive 
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disadvantage. If the European steel industry is going to a higher cost 
production because they have to shift away from carbon-intensive energy, 
that is putting European steel at a disadvantage to U.S. steel, which is not 
under a similar cap. Could trade measures begin to be introduced? Could 
the Europeans seek to sort of slap an extra tariff on U.S. steel or any sort 
of non-Kyoto steel? Would they be able to put on a tariff and raise the 
price? That kind of unpredictability, if we move in that direction, could get 
multi-nationals concerned about everyone being within the same regime. 
There are lots of potential world trade implications there, but I think that is 
important to keep in mind. 
The last point I wanted to make was about multi-nationals, or 
companies anyway, and the extent to which they embrace Kyoto. There 
are a lot of companies out there who are trying to figure out ways of 
making money off of Kyoto, those that are involved particularly in the 
transactions—the ones that want to sell their services to the Clean 
Development mechanism, and the ones that want to be brokers for the 
exchange and the trading of carbon offsets—have been at the front line of 
the companies that have been supporting Kyoto. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
That is exactly right. It is General Electric (GE). GE has this incredibly 
big program called “eco-imagination” where it is pouring a great deal of 
money into the technology. They see a tremendous area for the expansion 
of business. 
[INTERMISSION] 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
It is going to be a tremendous challenge to figure out how to have 
economic growth and prosperity while dealing with this issue. It is also 
going to be tremendously complicated, and important legally, because 
where there are difficult substantive problems, we know there are going to 
be lawyers. I think it is terrific that [law students] are here, and I think it is 
terrific that you students in the audience are thinking about this issue, 
because it is going to be of immense importance to your lives and the lives 
of your families. But it will also be, perhaps, a very interesting aspect of 
your legal careers. So I think it is terrific to have you here.  
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DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Are there any questions that anybody in the audience would like to put 
on the table? Or any issues that concern you, or responses to what you 
have heard?  
FEMALE SPEAKER (FROM AUDIENCE) 
There has been a lot of talk about the new technologies that are out 
there. Can any of you tell us what there is, and which ones are the most 
promising? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
In the power generation sector, the technologies that people are looking 
at are next-generation nuclear technologies, which are safer and hopefully 
have fewer of the issues that have plagued facilities in the past. However, 
you still have a proliferation issue if you are talking about trying to 
disseminate that technology internationally.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
I was watching Late Night with David Letterman. Senator McCain was 
on the show pushing his bill, and he made a big pitch for nuclear. He 
seems to think that expanded nuclear energy production lies in America’s 
future.  
WILLIAM PIZER 
Yeah, he actually lost votes on his McCain-Lieberman bill the second 
time it came up over the summer because he attached some nuclear 
provisions to it, and that scared off the California senators. I think nuclear 
is hugely important. I think one thing you have got to realize is that, for all 
the wrangling over the nuclear waste site of Yucca Mountain, that site will 
basically accommodate the waste from the plants we currently have 
running through their natural lives. So continuing to use nuclear power in 
the United States is going to require us to build another Yucca Mountain. 
That is the scale of the waste that we are talking about and obviously 
people are aware of how contentious that has been. So while nuclear 
power is important, and there are a lot of technological developments on a 
modularization of it, the process is certainly one piece of it.  
The big piece for the power generation sector is capture and 
sequestration, mainly because there are so many countries—key countries 
like India and China—that have such vast coal reserves. And even if we 
can convince ourselves not to burn our own coal, we are going to have a 
hard time convincing those countries not to burn theirs. So I think 
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developing ways that we can burn coal in a way that does not emit 
greenhouse gases is going to be important. 
In the transportation sector, the problem is a lot harder. You have to get 
rid of all oil as the primary energy mechanism in the transportation sector. 
You are talking either about fuel cells or electricity, using either hydrogen 
or electricity as the carrier, and trying to generate those cleanly. In the 
long run, those are really the options.  
In the shorter run and medium run, there are a lot of interesting things 
like hybrids and diesels. People get very excited about diesel hybrids; they 
can get several hundred miles to the gallon. We had an earlier 
conversation about bio-fuels, which are very promising as well. Cellulosic 
ethanol, for example, makes ethanol from woody material instead of corn. 
All those things are particularly promising. Those are the game-changing 
sorts of technologies that would be part of a long-term solution. But, as 
was mentioned earlier, there is a lot of stuff in the short-term—whether 
energy efficiency, more efficient buildings, more co-fired generation, 
better clean vehicle design—that can create important short to medium-
term improvements. But they are not going to be the kind of long-term 
solutions we need. The ones that we need are going to be those I just 
mentioned.  
J. KEVIN HEALY 
I just want to second the thought about carbon sequestration, the 
geological sequestration of carbon. I think that that is something that is 
being looked to in the short to medium-term as an important component of 
the solution. Keep in mind, there is a regulatory program in place now for 
the deep-well injection of waste. The EPA, under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, has been regulating the disposal of waste in deep injection wells for 
many years. That program is not perfect. It does not address certain issues 
that are important for carbon because carbon is buoyant, whereas these 
other wastes were not. But there is a regulatory program in place.  
There is also technology in place to strip CO2 out of emission streams. 
There are extensive pipeline infrastructures in the Texas and Gulf Coast 
areas that are very possibly going to be used for this. There is serious 
thinking being given to using CO2 to eek out the last bit of petroleum in 
the reservoirs that exist in that area, and in other areas around the world. 
That is a very tangible and real thing that, as I mentioned earlier, the 
Department of Energy is looking into in a very serious way. They have set 
up thirteen or so regional partnerships around the country where they are 
going to have pilot projects and programs put into place that actually do it. 
That is one thing, I think, that is going to provide some hope. 
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DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Any other questions? Yes? Ryan? 
RYAN CANTRELL 
This is a question for Mr. Healy. Most of us are looking to maybe go 
into some area of environmental law. As an environmental lawyer, how do 
you anticipate the landscape will look in the future? You mentioned that it 
might shift more towards a federal trademark that governs everything. But 
in the meantime, how do you, as an environmental attorney, navigate the 
different regulations that municipalities, states, and potentially federal 
government will place on environmental carbon change and carbon 
emissions? 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
Well what is interesting about it is that you are in on the ground floor. 
Right now, there really is very little climate change law, certainly in this 
country. And the prospects are very broad in terms of the reach of that law 
when you think about it. It flows from basic issues of land-use, to the 
extent that there is going to have to be smart growth. Even at the planning 
board level of government, there are climate-change implications, and I 
think that climate change will inform legal issues from that level all the 
way up to the level of international government relations. But if I were to 
guess where the activity would be in the near term for people just getting 
out of law school, it would seem to be in the project finance area. This is 
because, with the CDM and joint implementation mechanisms, there will 
be an additional reason to do energy-efficient projects in other areas of the 
world because there is now an additional asset—tradable credits—that is 
generated as a result of those projects. That is why I think that there may 
be some immediate activity in the project finance area. But you students 
will also be involved in creating climate-change law. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
If I might interject, the environmental community has always been very 
creative about using existing legal instruments to achieve objectives that, 
perhaps, were not associated with those instruments at the time of their 
formulation. In one interesting case, it was alleged that an environmental 
impact assessment prepared by a federal agency under NEPA was 
inadequate because it did not deal with the question of impacts in terms of 
climate change or contribution to climate change. That is sort of a simple 
example of where this kind of concern might begin to be felt. Are you 
familiar with that? 
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J. KEVIN HEALY 
Yes I am. Actually, there have been a couple of them. There were a few 
cases in the early ’90s, which were thrown out on the basis of standing, 
where the plaintiffs or petitioners were trying to get a court to compel the 
federal agencies to address climate change under NEPA, and to do an 
environmental impact statement that looked at the climate-change 
implications of their actions. More recently, there was a case being 
litigated in California, Friends of the Earth v. Watson. That might be the 
case that you are thinking of, where, to the surprise of many, the court did 
not throw it out. It was a case that was brought against the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation and Import Export Bank, and the 
defendants moved to have the case dismissed based primarily on standing, 
claiming there was no injury in fact and no causation between the failure 
on the part of the government to look at climate change and the injury that 
the plaintiffs were suffering. That is what the contention was. To the 
surprise of many, the court felt that, in fact, the substantial affidavits that 
were submitted by Friends of the Earth, either establishing or documenting 
the effects of climate change relating to projects across the world, were 
enough of a showing of injury in fact to sustain standing. That case is 
actually still going on in California, and is a very important case.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
I sense a constitutional law exam question in there somewhere. 
Anybody? Yes? 
FEMALE SPEAKER (FROM AUDIENCE) 
What kinds of structures would you like to put in place in terms of 
enforcement for Kyoto Protocol guidelines, especially if there is no system 
in place creating penalties for noncompliance? 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
As I understand it, there is, in fact, a penalty of sorts for noncompliance 
that was adopted as part of the Marrakech Accords. Something to the 
effect of a thirty percent greater penalty . . . 
WILLIAM PIZER 
You have to repay your overage plus 30%. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
It is set up to function with this compliance committee, which has two 
branches: the facilitative branch and the enforcement branch. The problem 
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is that when they set this in place in Kyoto article 18, they said that if there 
were going to be any repercussions—if it was going to be binding—they 
would have to amend the Protocol.  
Amending the Protocol would be like starting up a new treaty. You 
have to go through the ratification process and all that; it would be very 
time-consuming.  
And then you have the scenario where some parties ratified and some 
did not. They are supposed to get sanctioned, but they are not parties to the 
amendment, and this creates a problem. But what is happening now is that 
Saudi Arabia is proposing the adoption of an amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol to take on these commitments regarding noncompliance and the 
sanction methods. If the parties to the Kyoto Protocol go along with it, 
then it might just come into place through the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). Then you would have 
to see about the ratifications and whether they are going to do that as part 
of the amendment process. That will be interesting to see, but they have 
already taken the step of proposing the amendment. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
One of the ways in which the Kyoto Protocol is a really revolutionary 
international instrument is that it has the capacity, in essence, to enforce. It 
is one thing for an international treaty to have a binding consequence, or to 
have some sort of penalty flow from it, a sanction. But to have the ability 
to actually enforce that sanction is something that is unique to Kyoto.  
What Kyoto can do is, if this system—this committee—decides that the 
U.K., for example, has emitted more than it was allowed to under its cap, 
it will assign this penalty to the U.K. Because the Secretariat controls the 
official carbon budgets of all these countries, you look to the Secretariat to 
determine what each country’s assigned amount is. It can apply that 
[penalty]. And that is something more than the WTO can do. The WTO 
can only authorize one party to impose a trade sanction against another. 
But here, we have an international bureaucracy that can actually determine 
the penalty and apply it directly.  
Some people also think that it is the most naïve dimension of the entire 
Kyoto Protocol for a number of reasons. One is that the second 
commitment period is the period from which the tons that you have 
exceeded are going to be deducted. You know that you have two budgets: 
the existing budget and the next budget. The way in which the penalty is 
applied is that you are essentially forced to borrow tons from your second 
budget and use them in your first budget, and then you also get this 30% 
penalty. But we have not negotiated the second budget yet. So there is 
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clearly now an incentive for countries that are currently struggling with 
their compliance under the first commitment period to demand more of a 
budget in the second commitment period to cover any potential penalties 
that they might suffer in the first commitment period.  
The other aspect that is a bit naïve is [Kyoto] puts you under this sort 
of constant borrowing chain: if you fail to remain within your cap in the 
first commitment period, the penalty is to make things even tougher for 
you in the second commitment period. Is this a way in which you can 
really reasonably treat a government? Or is that government simply going 
to withdraw from the regime if you continue to ratchet down on it? So 
there are amazingly exciting things for international lawyers in these 
proposals that have been put forth in Kyoto, but they are also dangerous. 
They may be pushing the international legal system beyond a state which 
countries and governments will actually tolerate.  
The House of Lords, which is the upper chamber of the U.K. 
parliament—the guys who wear the wigs and the dresses and do not have 
much power but do have the ability to convene committees and to 
commission studies—came out with a recent report which includes 
amongst its criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol, that they have had a “naïve 
compliance mechanism which can only deter countries from signing up to 
subsequent tighter emissions targets.” They now see this as one of the 
flaws. I think this is in part influencing the Blair administration. I take this 
personally because my colleagues and I were very much a part of that 
naïve process of believing that we had these really unique opportunities to 
make binding law. Something that was enforceable, something that, if you 
had the political will of countries comply with, would work in the same 
effective ways that the domestic sulfur trading regime and other regimes 
have worked. But now, after reflection, it is being characterized, by the 
very governments that led in its design, as naïve.  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Is that not a question of political commitment not being as strong as it 
used to be? Because, if you have the commitment, you go with the 
program just like with the Montreal Protocol. And that was considered a 
success.  
WILLIAM PIZER 
Lurking in the background is always the opportunity to withdraw. That 
has always kind of struck me as an interesting aspect.  
One thing I wanted to clarify is that the 30% repayment rate is the 
restoration rate. It is not, at least it is not supposed to be, viewed in the 
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context of the Protocol as a penalty. It is basically the interest you would 
accrue over five years by not having the right amount of tons in the first 
commitment period versus the second. In the negotiation, it was very 
important that it not be seen as punitive because one of the few things the 
United States continues to be active on is issues of precedent, particularly 
the idea of punitive sanctions under the Protocol.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
To add to that, it was the United States that came up with this penalty 
proposal. When they first came up with it, it was 60%. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
Yeah, they changed their minds. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
So was that supposed to include interest too? If they suggest— 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
No. They are saying that this was basically the discount rate. If you are 
gaming the system, and you decide to put off some of your emissions now 
and just accept the penalty later because you think that, for whatever 
reason, it will be cheaper, you will invest the money, earn interest on it, 
and then buy the extra tons. When the penalty comes along—they 
basically calculated that you would need a 60% multiplier in order to 
essentially make—  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Less interesting. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
The whole goal of the system is to make compliance cheaper than 
noncompliance, right? That is why the penalty is there—to make sure that 
noncompliance is more expensive than compliance—and they came up 
with a multiplier of 1.6.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Yes? 
MALE SPEAKER (FROM AUDIENCE) 
Underlying the deep mechanistic provision are participating nations, 
developed nations, developing nations. And for this third group is the idea 
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that developing nations, at some point, become developed nations. And 
then you shift it to the other category. How does that actually happen 
when there is a developing nation and developed nation? 
WILLIAM PIZER 
You touched on the issue of graduation which was huge. And I guess it 
continues to be debated because, obviously, when you are a developing 
country, you have a slightly better deal and the issue of how you define 
what constitutes graduating into the world of those accepting 
responsibilities is not clear. There are countries that are not in Annex I, 
Israel for example, that would strike you as countries whose level of 
economic development suggests they should have obligations. So this is 
still a very contentious issue among developing countries. I do not know if 
anybody else has any— 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
I do not believe there are any clear criteria for what constitutes the 
point at which you graduate. I know there have been a lot of markers 
suggested.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Sure. The idea is that you graduate as you are convinced to join the 
next commitment period. In some essence, it has already happened in that, 
in the movement from the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change to the Kyoto Protocol, there were economies in transition. 
Eastern block countries joined the European Union and, in the process of 
negotiating their Kyoto Protocol commitment, undertook the same level of 
cuts that all European Union (EU) member states undertook. Essentially, 
they moved categories in preparation for joining the EU. So the idea is that 
when we start negotiating in 2012 to 2020, you bring in the other 
countries. That is how they graduate.  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Is not the status of being a developing country based on Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) that of the United Nations (UN) sets up in its 
global reports? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Yes. The UN system has a way of categorizing countries. But each 
individual treaty can categorize them differently. 
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ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Right. So this wouldn’t specify anything different. 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
The legacy goes back to the Framework Convention, where it was not 
so much about defining who was a developing country, but rather, who 
was an industrialized country. They basically used the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership at that 
time to determine which were the wealthy developing countries. The next 
category—the industrialized countries—included those, plus the members 
of the Eastern European group in the UN system. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
Because of that, the OECD now has Mexico and South Korea as 
members, but they are not part of Annex I.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
That is right. Mexico joined in ’94 and South Korea in 1996. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
And Turkey used to be Annex I, but in 1997 they asked to be removed 
from Annex I.  
JACOB WERKSMAN 
They were originally OECD members. They have been, pretty much 
from the beginning, so they were classified as rich industrialized. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Ryan? 
RYAN CANTRELL 
I know when the United Nations held a convention over the laws they 
conceived they created an international tribunal to address questions. Is 
there a similar international tribunal that can have jurisdiction over Kyoto 
Protocol disputes between countries, or is it just the United Nations? And 
if there is a jurisdiction, does it have enforcement abilities other than 
applying those interest rates? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
The answer is kind of yes and no. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) does have jurisdiction over the Kyoto Protocol if the particular 
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parties to the dispute agree to allow it to have jurisdiction. And there is a 
provision of the Framework Convention that allows you to opt in and say, 
“If a dispute arises under this convention, we agree to go the ICJ for it.” 
As far as I know, no country has actually signed up for that option.  
That leads me to the specialized dispute settlement—or rather—
enforcement regime within the Kyoto Protocol, which is the one we were 
just discussing. This committee has been set up to look at how much a 
country has emitted at the end of the commitment period, compare it to 
their obligation, and impose a penalty if it exceeded its cap. It is not a 
court in the sense that it is not intended to deal with disputes between 
parties over differences in interpretation of the law. Rather, it is an 
enforcement mechanism that is essentially designed as an administrative 
function to determine whether or not any individual party has exceeded its 
cap and then to possibly impose a penalty.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Yes, in the back? 
MALE SPEAKER (FROM AUDIENCE) 
Seeing that our private businesses are second in technology and are 
being good citizens of the world, are there any changes in the government 
structure that you could possibly see affecting the power of good will, or 
see how it changes? 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
That is a tough question. 
WILLIAM PIZER 
I think we just have to be a little bit careful. Regarding your example of 
Japan, it has not created any mechanisms that are going to guarantee its 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. It has a number of programs in place, 
but it rejected the idea of any sort of a cap or emissions tax on greenhouse 
gases. They clearly have some very different sorts of programs for fuel 
economy and things like that, which have been very successful. 
One of the things that—again, I have to wear my little pointy 
economist hat—sometimes does a slight disservice to the environment is 
trying to argue too much that there is a free lunch out there, that we can do 
this really cheaply. I think there are some free lunches out there actually, 
some things that companies can do to reduce their emissions and make 
money, but fundamentally, the problem of climate change is going to cost 
resources. But I think it is worth it because the environment is worth 
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spending money on. As you suggested, it is good will. But I think it is also 
a recognition that the environment is worthwhile and worth spending 
resources. It is going to fundamentally alter the political dynamics in the 
United States, and, as we were discussing earlier, there are some signs that 
is changing, especially in the U.S. Senate. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
I would like to add that there is some aspect of seeing trouble down the 
road. It is not necessarily out of the goodness of their hearts that 
corporations are doing something. In some circumstances, they are 
actually being induced by their shareholders—compelled is too strong of a 
word—to worry about climate change and do something about it. There is 
a very strong movement afoot amongst shareholders.  
For example, there is a group under an umbrella that the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) has put together. I 
suggest that you type the word “CERES” into your computer and see what 
is up with them. It is astounding. This group has put together a coalition of 
shareholders that controls about $1 trillion in investment money. It is 
going after one major corporation after another in an organized fashion, 
and is getting them to put together climate change plans through proxy 
initiatives. And, because of the power represented by these groups, what is 
essentially happening is that one company after another is saying, “We do 
not want to get into a fight with you. We are just going to do it. We think 
it makes sense to do it.” American Electric Power (A.E.P.), one of the 
major power companies in the country, has done that. Ford has done it. 
Southern Company has done it. So shareholders are essentially inducing 
corporations to get into the game. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
What do these plans look like, Kevin? Do you know? 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
You can go onto the internet and see A.E.P.’s plan in cyberspace. It is a 
very comprehensive look at climate change, how it is going to affect the 
company in the future, and what ought to be done in order to deal with the 
prospect of climate change.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
One thing we were talking about in the hall that might be interesting to 
address, somewhat theoretically interesting, is the prospect of international 
litigation on climate. Jacob, I think you were bringing up some stuff that 
p333 Kyoto Protocol book pages.doc 4/25/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] RETHINKING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 377 
 
 
 
 
you thought might be in the works or possible. Do you want to talk a little 
bit about that? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
Well, I actually think that more of the action is in domestic litigation at 
the moment than in international litigation, but it goes back to Ryan’s 
question about whether there are courts out there that could actually 
adjudicate a dispute about climate change. Say you were a lawyer who is 
representing a small island country suffering the impacts of global 
warming and is concerned about the potential effects of global warming. 
You essentially want to sue the U.S. government for its failure to 
adequately limit its emissions. Now take that scenario ten or fifteen years 
from now, or even twenty years from now. Is there a court through which 
you could do that? Is there a legal theory under which you could establish 
the responsibility of the United States for the damage that it was causing to 
your environment, to the global environment?  
There are a lot of principles out there that seem to guide you towards 
the conclusion that yes, under international law, the United States is 
generally responsible as a state to ensure that its activities do not cause 
trans-boundary environmental damage to other states or to the global 
environment. There are a number of principles of this nature for which the 
United States has signed up, and you can find similar principles in the 
general statement of international law issued by the State Department.  
But it becomes much more complicated when you try to apply that 
principle to any particular kind of activity. Every state on the planet is 
clearly emitting greenhouse gases and is therefore, in theory, responsible 
as a state for its contribution to that damage.  
So the real challenge is trying to figure out, from a legal point of view, 
how much is too much. When do your emissions of greenhouse gases rise 
to a level where you have actually breached your duty? And the question 
then becomes whether the United States, through its current activities, is 
breaching that duty. Has it gone beyond the emission level that is 
generally considered to be responsible for a state? And if so, how could 
you construct that legal theory, and what court would actually hear that 
case? I think that if you have proved all of the causation issues—that U.S. 
emissions were contributing to climate change, that global warming was 
causing the sea level to rise, that sea level rise was damaging this 
particular state—then you ask whether it can possibly be true, knowing 
what we know today, that international law will not hold you liable or 
accountable for doing nothing? Does international law actually not have an 
answer to that question? I think that the answer to that is not clear—that 
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international law does not actually provide any answer to that question. 
But if that is so, then what is left of international law? 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
When you are talking about state responsibility, the United States is not 
specifically breaching any treaty by carrying on the way it is. If you are 
talking of Rio Declaration principle 2 or Stockholm Declaration principle 
21 (they are considered customary international law), then yes, you are 
injuring the other states. And if the Marshall Islands just disappears from 
the face of the earth because of climate change, they have received 
permission from New Zealand to relocate there. But still, somebody might 
have liked it back home. So I think that is true. You have an issue there, I 
think. But it is a question of the same International Law Commission 
(ILC) that set up the draft articles on state responsibility. It has been 
working on the liability aspect where you could be liable even if there is 
no breach of international law. I think that would lend some more weight 
to the argument, and perhaps make it easier to succeed if a case were to be 
brought by, for instance, the Marshall Islands against the United States. 
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
To be the devil’s advocate here, let us assume we have a robust legal 
theory which would impose some form of responsibility on the United 
States, and there is a forum in which that claim could be advanced and 
ultimately adjudicated. What’s the remedy? 
JACOB WERKSMAN 
The remedy, technically, is reparations. They would have to cease their 
activity and recompense. The next question is whether it is enforceable. 
Even if the International Court of Justice sitting in The Hague decides in 
favor of the Marshall Islands, or the government of Tuvalu, and finds the 
United States is responsible for the damage that occurred, how would it 
possibly enforce that? The United States has walked away from 
unfavorable International Court of Justice decisions in the past, and I 
would think that even if you got them into court, which is pretty unlikely 
because you would need their consent to participate in the case, if you 
went the wrong way for the premiers perspective, it wouldn’t really be an 
enforceable judgment. 
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
But that does not look good. 
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JACOB WERKSMAN 
It does not. I suppose it would be very embarrassing—though we don’t 
embarrass easily.  
DOUGLAS WILLIAMS 
Kevin? 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
There is an interesting case going on domestically, which is sort of 
parallel to the discussion we are having about the international scene. 
There is a lawsuit that has been brought by eight states, and the City of 
New York, against the five major power producers in the country, under 
the federal common law of public nuisance, the theory being that under the 
federal common law, where the activity in State A is causing harm in State 
B, it is a public nuisance actionable by the affected state.  
What is going on here, based upon that theory, is that the states and the 
City of New York are saying that the activity of emitting CO2 in the 
various states where it is being emitted is leading to the emission of 
greenhouse gases, which are crossing state lines, trapping heat, and 
causing damage to our states. They are relying on a case, Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), which is an old case that you will 
probably know if you are taking environmental law, where the State of 
Illinois sued the City of Milwaukee for the discharge of sewage into Lake 
Michigan that floated down the lake and impacted Illinois.  
The recent climate change case was brought in the Southern District of 
New York in front of Judge Preska, who granted a motion to dismiss 
based not on standing, interestingly enough, but on a separation of powers 
theory. Her concern was that climate change is such a big issue that, even 
if it were a public nuisance, it is the mother of all public nuisances and has 
sweeping implications—economic, political, social—that are too big for a 
federal district court judge to handle. She determined that the exercise of 
her equitable powers in such a case would require policy decisions that are 
not appropriate for her to make, that are better left to the President and the 
Congress. She was not going to get into the business of regulating CO2. So 
at least in that case, the judge pushed the issue to where she felt it should 
be: a responsible President and Congress.  
The question I have is how that case would have turned out, even in the 
lower court, if it were for damages? The plaintiffs were only seeking a 
mandatory injunction. They were not seeking damages, and the worries 
that Judge Preska had would not have been applicable to an action for 
damages.  
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And by the way, an action for damages has been brought in the 
Southern District of Mississippi (Comber v. Murphy Oil, 2006 WL 
1474089). A class action has been filed in that court in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina. That action was commenced against the petroleum 
industry essentially on the basis of alleged negligence, and what the 
plaintiffs are saying is that the petroleum companies knew or should have 
known that climate change was occurring, and they knew or should have 
known that there was a link between climate change and greenhouse gases. 
As a result, the plaintiffs assert that the companies knew or should have 
known that as a result, the water was warming. Not much has happened in 
that case other than the filing of a complaint. But it is interesting to see 
that it was filed.  
ANITA HALVORSSEN 
That was fast. 
J. KEVIN HEALY 
Of course, there is a long way between filing a complaint, or even 
establishing injury in fact for purposes of standing, and actually proving a 
case in court—that a particular injury has been caused by a particular 
company’s emission of greenhouse gases. There is an interesting article 
that was written in the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law by David 
Grossman, which looks at each of the obstacles a plaintiff would face in 
climate-change-related litigation. He believes that these obstacles can be 
overcome if the plaintiff is a state entity where you can aggregate the 
damages. I would recommend that you take a look at that law review 
article. 
 
